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Abstract 
This paper clarifies how the benefits and costs of water quality 
improvements in Lake Rotorua are likely to be shared in the absence of a trading 
system; presents different perspectives on and principles for deciding how costs 
should be allocated; and then shows how different options for initially allocating 
nutrient allowances and achieving reductions in the cap over time conform with 
those cost-sharing principles.  There is no ‘correct’ answer to the question of who 
should pay.  The ‘best’ answer for Lake Rotorua will depend on what the community 
thinks is fair and what will be politically feasible. If the trading market does not 
operate efficiently, the way that allowances are allocated will affect the efficiency with 
which the catchment achieves its environmental goal.  If the allocation of allowances 
provides significant capital it could also affect economic behaviour by loosening 
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1  Introduction 
Deciding who should pay for improvements in lake water quality is always 
a politically challenging issue. Our aim in this paper is to clarify how benefits and 
costs are likely to be shared with no free allocation of emissions units; present 
principles for deciding how costs should be shared; and then show how different 
options for allocating nutrient allowances and achieving reductions in the cap over 
time conform with those cost-sharing principles.  This paper provides the detail on 
the allocation proposal within the prototype nutrient trading system outlined in Lock 
and Kerr (2009). 
There is no ‘correct’ answer to the question of who should pay.  The ‘best’ 
answer for Lake Rotorua will depend on what the community thinks is fair and what 
will be politically feasible.  Cost bearing has direct economic  impacts on those 
affected.  It also has implications for perceptions of fairness and hence support for 
the regulation, relationships within the community, and social well being in a broader 
sense.  If stringent environmental targets are chosen, allowances will be valuable and 
allocation rules will alter wealth significantly. Any rules for sharing costs and 
allocating allowances need to be relatively simple and transparent so they are easy to 
implement and will be perceived to be fair. 
The allocation of allowances will be important for the efficiency with 
which we meet environmental goals, but only if the trading market is not operating 
efficiently.  This may be important in the short run as people learn how to use the 
market.  If the allocation of allowances provides significant capital it could also affect 
economic behaviour by loosening capital constraints that limit land development and 
mitigation. 
This paper is part of a series developed through a dialogue process with a 
group of experienced stakeholders and experts. We have drawn on these meetings 
and others’ research to develop a prototype nutrient trading system for the Lake 
Rotorua catchment and assess its feasibility. The other papers in the series are 
available at www.motu.org.nz/research/detail/nutrient_trading.   
2  What will the nutrienttrading system cost? 
The costs of a nutrient trading system arise from setting up the system, 
ongoing administration and, most importantly, reducing nutrient loss.  Similar costs 2 
would be associated with other types of regulation that achieve the same 
environmental outcome. 
2.1  Costs of nutrient reductions 
  Excluding reductions from changes in land use and management, the 
costs of the Proposed Lakes Rotorua & Rotoiti Action Plan (Environment Bay of 
Plenty 2007) are expected to be on the order of $10m per year. This would achieve 
an ongoing total reduction of around 59 tonnes nitrogen (N) per year and 16 tonnes 
phosphorus (P) per year. The costs per kilo of nutrient reduction vary widely even 
among actions confirmed by Environment Bay of Plenty (EBOP) (Table 1).  
Table 1  Indicative costs of various reduction options1 



































  Rotorua Wastewater Treatment Plant upgrade  $99 (N) 
Community wastewater reticulation or OSET 
upgrade for Rotorua 
$460 (N) max 
Storm water upgrades within urban Rotorua  $348 (N) 
$2,092 (P) 
Tikitere geothermal   $4 (N)2 



































Phosphorus flocculation in two other streams  $140 (P) 





Land use management and land use change  $6 (N) 3 
Source:  Proposed Lakes Rotorua and Rotoiti Action Plan (Environment Bay of Plenty et al (2007: 15) 
Landowners could incur costs from a number of  actions designed to 
mitigate nutrient outputs. These include changes in current land use or avoiding a 
planned future use. The cost of land use change is the difference in profitability 
between the potential and actual use.  Landowners may also change land use 
management practices, which may require capital investments and a likely loss in 
profitability. The costs of land-use management options vary widely. No strongly 
supported cost estimates are available for the additional 170 tonnes of reductions 
                                                            
1 This information was removed from later drafts of the Lakes Rotorua and Rotoiti Action Plan, including the 
version finally released for public consultation. 
2 This cost per kg-N is lower than other actions because the Tikitere geothermal flow has a high nitrogen 
concentration and low volume, and is close to existing reticulation infrastructure. 
3 $6 per kg-N is simply a budgeted average for expected costs over 10 years.  The nutrient reductions from land 
use/land use management changes will continue beyond 10 years, but total costs will be capped at $10 million.   3 
sought from land use but the per tonne cost is probably much lower than for the 
options in Table 1.  
The costs of land use management options vary widely. Landowners have 
the best information on the cost of these actions. If these reductions are achieved 
through further tightening of Rule 11 (a rule that attempts to freeze nutrient losses 
through farm management plans), they are likely to be very high for some properties 
because they will make some land uses, such as dairy farming, very difficult.   
2.2  Impact of a trading system on costs 
A nutrient trading system should reduce the costs of mitigation by 
allowing mitigation to occur in the places and at the times where it costs least. It 
should also encourage landowners to be innovative in seeking more profitable and 
less damaging land uses. The ability of the trading system to reduce costs will depend 
on how efficient the current farm level caps on nutrient loss are (under rule 11) 
relative to non-land related mitigation efforts, and how mitigation opportunities are 
distributed. Assessing this is an empirical question. It also depends on how successful 
the trading system is in facilitating and enabling innovative mitigation options. In 
previous similar systems, such as the US Acid Rain programme, which used 
emissions trading to reduce sulphur dioxide, the costs within the trading system were 
much lower than anticipated (Ellerman et al (2000)).    
Those who have flexibility are most able to benefit from trading.  Some 
people argue that we need to create more flexibility in the District and Regional plans 
to allow changes in land use and management and to facilitate compliance.  It may 
also be useful to provide advice and technical support to those who have significant 
potential to reduce nutrient loss at relatively low cost.  This reduces the burden on 
these people who may be disadvantaged in other ways and also reduces the demand 
for allowances thus lowering the cost for all.   
The person who directly pays the cost of mitigation is not necessarily the 
one who ultimately bears it. Some costs can be passed on to customers, tax and 
ratepayers and employees. Where the products are exported, Rotorua farmers are 
unlikely to have a significant effect on their export price so they probably can’t pass 
costs on except to employees (possibly by no longer employing them) and local 
suppliers. Costs borne by firms providing local services however are likely to be able 4 
to pass on some costs.  Examples could include golf courses, and others in the 
tourism sector. 
Costs  are likely to affect the values of different land parcels so a 
disproportionate amount of cost will be borne by those who own the land or other 
affected assets at the time when the regulations are created. For example a dairy farm 
is worth a lot more with no regulation than once regulation is introduced.  
2.3  Interactions with the New Zealand emissions trading system 
The New Zealand government intends to introduce agricultural 
greenhouse gas emissions (methane and nitrous oxide) into the national emissions 
trading system in 2013.  This provides important context for nutrient trading. Many 
of the mitigation options that will reduce nutrient loss, for example land use change 
toward less intensive uses and reductions in use of fertiliser, will also reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Those landowners who carry out these options could 
receive a double benefit because they will need fewer nutrient allowances but also 
fewer New Zealand emission units (NZ Units).  This will lower the additional cost of 
nutrient management. Some nutrient mitigation options such as riparian boundaries 
will have no effect on greenhouse gases, while others such as straw bales to catch 
nutrient run-off could potentially increase greenhouse gas emissions
4
3  Principles for cost sharing  
.   
The emissions trading system will also involve some free allocation of NZ 
Units, which will almost certainly affect landowners in the Lake Rotorua catchment.  
The form of this allocation to farmers is as yet undecided but those who own land 
with indigenous or plantation forests established after 1990 are already eligible to 
benefit.   
We explore here five different sets of principles for cost sharing:  those 
who benefit from a cleaner lake should pay; those who created the problem should 
pay; those who pollute now should pay; current emitters have inherent property 
rights; and a variety of equity concerns (cost sharing should reward existing efforts to 
mitigate, protect the poor and vulnerable, and treat those who are similar in a similar 
way).  
                                                            
4 Kerr and Kennedy (2009) discuss this issue in more depth. 5 
3.1  Those who benefit from a cleaner lake should pay  
One potential principle for cost sharing is that those who benefit from the 
regulation bear its cost. The benefits are spread both within and outside the 
catchment and between people alive today and future generations. We discuss the 
ways in which each group receives benefit because these may clarify which groups 
could bear costs and what share they may bear
5
3.1.1  Within catchment 
.  Some of these benefits will be 
economic and others will be aesthetic or recreational. Still others will arise from 
cultural values.  Non-human values are also associated with a cleaner lake but these 
do not have an obvious implication for cost sharing so are not discussed here. They 
would affect the overall environmental goal that is chosen. 
Here we break the beneficiaries into those alive today, both within and 
outside the catchment, and future generations in order to more closely align with 
potential cost sharing mechanisms. 
A number of groups within the Rotorua catchment would benefit from 
improved lake water quality.  Tourists and holidaymakers benefit from recreational 
activities on the lake such as sports, swimming, and fishing, and through the aesthetic 
values they place on looking at an attractive clean lake.  Property owners receive 
these benefits directly; they also receive benefit through higher property values. 
Those with views of the lake or good access to the lake will get the most value. 
Tourism operators near Lake Rotorua, including hotel and restaurant owners and 
tour companies, benefit because their business derives in part from those who come 
to enjoy the lake.  The local community benefits indirectly from employment and 
other economic activity associated with tourism and people moving to Rotorua to 
enjoy the lake.     
Distinguishing between locals and visitors to the Rotorua region is 
important for cost sharing reasons. Locals will bear cost either as property owners or 
rate payers, though tax incidence may mean that visitors also bear costs while in the 
catchment. 
                                                            
5 For some existing analysis see Bell et al (2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b, 2007) 6 
3.1.2  Beyond the catchment 
The benefits of clean lake water for New Zealand’s ‘clean green’ image 
could be significant but are hard to quantify. The clean green image improves access 
to agricultural markets and increases product premiums and tourism demand. The 
Rotorua catchment has a high profile as a tourist destination, which means that 
activities in the area could affect visitors’ perception of New Zealand water quality 
and our efforts to protect it. The key beneficiaries of the ‘clean green’ image relating 
to water quality are exporters (especially farmers) and the tourism sector nationwide: 
tourism operators, hotel owners, airlines etc.  
A second group of beneficiaries outside the catchment (and potentially 
outside New Zealand) are those who think they might visit, or who will enjoy 
products (e.g. movies) that use the local environment. These values are called ‘option 
values’.  
Third, some people both within New Zealand and abroad may never visit 
but simply like to know that the lakes are clean and that the products they consume 
are not causing undue environmental degradation. This is called ‘existence value’ 
because these people need never directly use the lake.  These option and existence 
values are the fundamental drivers for the value of our ‘clean green’ image.  
Finally, other catchments will benefit directly from improved water quality 
in Lake Rotorua. Water quality in Lake Rotoiti, the Kaituna River and the Maketu 
estuary are heavily determined by the quality of water flowing out of Lake Rotorua. 
3.1.3  Future generations 
Within our lifetimes, the lake may stabilise but (unless we live a long time) 
is unlikely to improve significantly. Our generation could avoid the cost of a 
significantly worse lake. Future generations could benefit from improved lake quality. 
3.2  Those who created the problem should pay 
The Resource Management Act enshrines the principle of polluter pays.  
Section 15 states that ‘there is no presumed right to discharge contaminants into the 
environment’ and Section 17 states that ‘everyone has a duty to avoid, remedy or 
mitigate any adverse effect on the environment arising from that person’s activities.’ 
One part of ‘polluter pays’ is that those who put us in our current 
predicament should pay. Historical nutrient loss determines much of current water 7 
quality and quality in the near future because of long groundwater lags and a build up 
of nutrient in  the lake  sediment.  Should those who were responsible for those 
nutrient flows pay the cost of clean up? 
This is consistent with the Maori concept of ‘utu’, which is the need to fix 
historical wrongs done to others. It is very different if the harm is done knowingly 
rather than unknowingly but even accidental wrongs need to be corrected. 
Responsibility is passed on from generation to generation. Thus, if the government 
(the Regional Council and its predecessors, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
and its predecessors) encouraged farmers in the past to intensify and increase 
fertiliser application, the farmer is not the perpetrator, even though they may have 
benefited. Even if the government did not understand the effects of these policies, 
they still indirectly caused damage and need to fix the historical wrong.  In contrast, a 
principle based on who benefited economically from agricultural intensification 
would impose costs on landowners who have been in the catchment a long time, and 
on New Zealanders as a whole and particularly those in the Rotorua region who 
benefited from the agricultural boom. 
How far back do we go in assigning responsibility? That depends on 
groundwater lags and on how the historical emissions are locked up in lakebed 
sediments that contribute to current fluxes. The lake water itself has a short residence 
time but nitrates can stay in the groundwater system for up to 200 years. 
Consequently, a high percentage of current nitrates in the lake that are not deeply 
buried in sediments are the result of activity more than 5 years ago.  
3.3  Those who pollute now should pay 
Current emitters are identified in the Action Plan. Table  2  estimates 
current controllable exports of nutrients from different sources. The tables show that 
pastoral farming creates 71 percent of total N and 42.5 percent of total P exports. Of 
pastoral uses, dairying is responsible for 52 percent of N exports and 24.3 percent of 
P exports, while sheep and beef together export 40.2 percent of N and 61 percent of 
P. These high rates for dairying are reinforced when calculated per hectare. Dairy 
farms produce 50 kg/ha/yr of N, alongside 28 kg/ha/yr for the catchment as a 
whole (Lock and Kerr (2008)). The tables show that urban sources are currently 
responsible for just 6.4 percent of N and 9.6 percent of P outflows – the sewage 8 
outflows have largely been cleaned up. This was paid for by ratepayers with some 
national tax payer assistance. 
Table 2 Lake Rotorua’s nutrient inflows  








Native forest & 
scrub  42.1  5.4  1.31  3.3 
Exotic forest  28.4  3.6  0.95  2.4 
Cropping & 
horticulture  16.9  2.2  0.56  1.4 
Pasture [p]  563.0  71.9  16.93  42.5 
Lifestyle  11.1  1.4  0.5  1.3 
Urban [u]  50.1  6.4  3.82  9.6 
Springs  -  -  1.4  3.5 
Geothermal  42.2  5.4  1.4  3.5 
Waterfowl  1.4  0.2  0.8  2.0 
Rain  29.2  3.7  1.33  3.3 
Total   783.1  100  39.80  100 
 










Beef  41.9  7.4  1.08  6.4 
Sheep  0.5  0.1  0.03  0.2 
Sheep & beef  184.3  32.7  9.22  54.4 
Deer  6.3  1.1  0.38  2.2 
Deer/sheep/beef  23.3  4.1  1.16  6.8 
Dairy  294.1  52.2  4.12  24.3 
Grassland  5.1  0.9  0.38  2.2 
Other  7.5  1.3  0.57  3.4 
Total  563.0  100  16.93  100 
 










Sewage  28.0  55.9  1.00  26.2 
Septic tanks  12.0  23.9  0.53  13.9 
Storm water  10.1  20.2  2.29  59.9 
Total  50.1  100  3.82  100 
Note: These figures are not time-bound.  They are exports of nutrients rather than inputs to the lake.  
Source:  Proposed Lakes Rotorua and Rotoiti Action Plan, Environment Bay of Plenty et al (2007: 50) 
 
3.4  Current emitters have inherent property rights 
A different set of principles comes from a more legal approach to 
entitlement. These are often powerful in political debate where losses in asset values 
as a result of regulation are sometimes referred to as ‘takings’. Many argue that 
current emitters have an implicit property right that should be upheld.  
Tighter nutrient regulation lowers the value of land that benefits from the 
ability to apply nutrients. In particular, dairy farms are likely to fall significantly in 9 
value. Owners of property at the time the regulation is announced will bear much of 
the cost of the loss of future profitability through decreased land values.  
3.5  Other principles for cost sharing 
Three other issues are important for deciding socially acceptable cost 
sharing.  The first is that those who have already made efforts to mitigate should be 
rewarded. To many this simply seems just. It also can encourage people to continue 
voluntary efforts to enhance lake quality including (but not limited to) supporting 
widespread compliance with the regulations and efforts to find and disseminate new 
approaches to mitigation.  
Another key equity principle is that poor and vulnerable parts of the 
community should be protected from harm. In the Rotorua catchment this includes 
low wage earners, those at risk of unemployment and poor landowners (e.g. Maori 
who are dependent on small land blocks). The tangata whenua are distinctive in their 
roles and responsibilities in the catchment but their specific interests and willingness 
to assume a stewardship role is very iwi/hapu specific and so the implications for 
cost bearing are not clear. 
  Finally, a commonly expressed principle is that landowners with 
‘similar’ properties should be treated similarly.  This makes sense but begs the 
question of on what basis they should be similar: should similarity be measured in 
past or potential nutrient loss, in  property size or land use?  More broadly this 
principle argues for rules that are transparent and avoid special treatment of any 
specific group. 
4  Translating cost sharing principles into allowance 
allocation options 
Free allocation of nutrient allowances is the key instrument for moving 
costs away from those who would otherwise bear them by directly funding mitigation 
actions, losing profit through constrained production or through tax incidence and 
capitalisation of losses..  Once a cap is converted into tradable allowances, those who 
receive them hold a valuable asset and those who need to buy them face an 
additional cost. Thus the questions of how allowances are initially allocated, and how 
the costs of reducing the cap over time are managed (e.g. by proportionately reducing 
the ‘nutrient value’ of each allowance or buying back some allowances) are critical to 10 
the final distribution of net costs. Who faces these net costs should be determined 
based on the cost principles discussed in the section above. 
Figure 1    Cost of mitigation and value of allowances 
 
0 nutrient loss 
Mitigation relative to BAU emissions 




Business as usual 
Value of allowances 
Cost of mitigation 
 
How does mitigation cost relate to allowance values? As Figure 1 shows, 
they are not equal. In the market as a whole, the total value of allowances will be 
equal to the market price p* times the total number of allowances in the market. 
Every individual emitter will have some opportunities to mitigate at a lower cost per 
unit than the allowance price.  The total cost of mitigation is the shaded area under 
the curve on the left. Depending on how great these opportunities are, and how 
many allowances they were initially allocated, each individual will then either buy 
some allowances at full cost or sell them at a profit. The cost to any individual in a 
nutrient trading system is: 
Cost = (BAU Nutrient loss – free allocation) * allowance price              (1)  
- net change in profit as a result of changed input and output prices  
- net change in profit as a result of mitigation actions 
Full allocation of allowances on the basis of historical (business as usual) 
emissions could overcompensate all emitters – the introduction of the system could 
make them wealthier.  This suggests that emitters should receive fewer allowances 
than their business as usual emissions. However, if Rule 11, which constrains current 
emissions, is effective, landowners are bearing some costs of mitigation even at their 
current emissions levels. We also cannot pass costs back to previous landowners so 
costs that ‘should’ be borne by them would have to be related to current 
landownership if it is included at all. 11 
Emitters can be partly compensated for losses through some free 
allocation of allowances. At the same time, non-emitters who we believe should bear 
some costs could buy back some allowances from emitters.  The balance of free 
allocation and buy back, plus any focused efforts to protect vulnerable groups 
(probably funded directly through rates rather than related to allowances) determines 
the final distribution of cost across current and potential emitters, those who are 
responsible for historical emissions, and local, national and international beneficiaries 
of improved water quality.   
4.1  Sharing costs between emitters and non-emitters 
While emitters should not be fully allocated allowances to match business 
as usual nutrient loss, neither should they be allocated only the target level of nutrient 
loss implied by the trading cap, especially if the cap is significantly lower  than 
business as usual.  
Figure 2 shows different paths of nitrogen input to the lake and illustrates 
different responsibilities. A similar figure could be drawn for phosphorus. The lowest 
line in Figure 2 illustrates the nitrogen levels possible if all activity in the catchment 
were stopped and land were converted to plantation forestry – emitters should not 
be responsible for nitrogen below this line. The peak in the three lower curves shows 
the effect of lags for nitrogen already in the groundwater but not yet in the lake. The 
second lowest curve is a possible path for nitrogen under a trading system.  The 
difference between this and the lowest curve defines a series of trading caps on 
nitrogen inputs to the lake in each year.    
The next curve up (second curve from top) suggests that for each vintage, 
emitters could be allocated less than Rule 11 levels  (top curve) so that some 
additional nitrogen reductions are done at landowners’ expense. 
   12 
Figure 2    Cost sharing, free allocation of allowances and buy-back (illustrative curves) 
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  Further reductions in allowances to get down to the level of the trading 
cap (the regulated level of controllable inputs allowed) would be achieved through 
buy-back by various groups. Imposing some cost on district and regional ratepayers 
and on specific local sectors (e.g. tourism, fishermen, developers), can be justified by 
the benefits they would receive from higher lake quality and the historical benefits 
they have received from the economic activity associated with historical emissions.   
These groups could bear cost through local rates or through a special levy 
on tourists or on property owners. For example, it has been suggested that property 
developers should be required to contribute to lake quality above normal rates. 
Fishermen could also be charged an additional levy for fishing in Lake Rotorua and 
tourists could be charged a per night or per attraction fee.  
The farming sector throughout New Zealand could contribute in 
recognition of the value of the clean green image to their exports. To the extent that 
central government policy is held responsible for historical emissions and that all 
New Zealand citizens benefited from the prosperity brought by the boom in farming 
(and fertiliser use), the central government could be expected to contribute. The 
Central government’s agreement to pay half the costs of implementing the current 
action plan (NZPA (2008)) sets one possible precedent for cost sharing between 
non-emitters. Part of this funding could be used to buy back allowances from 
emitters as shown in Figure 2, though this is not the current intention. 
It has been proposed by another stakeholder group that landowners 
should bear around one quarter of the cost of the planned programme of nutrient 13 
reduction actions through targeted rates. It may be preferable for them to make their 
contribution more efficiently through a tighter cap in the nutrient trading system and 
a fall in their allowance allocation (e.g. reduce cap and allocation to landowners by 
one quarter of 59 tonnes N). This translates to a reduction of just 0.75 kg per ha of 
pastoral land. As context, sheep/beef land currently loses a total of around 18 kg per 
ha each year and dairy loses around 50kg. It seems likely that relatively minor 
mitigation or small amounts of land conversion would achieve this reduction. If 
EBOP and RDC participate in the trading system, some of the planned reduction 
actions could be replaced by lower cost land-use related reductions.  
4.2  Cost sharing among emitters 
Above we discussed the total share of cost to be borne by emitters and 
how this relates to the total amount of allowances that would be allocated freely to 
them. The remaining question is how these allowances should be allocated among 
emitters.  We need to balance four issues: long term equity in cost-bearing; a desire 
not to penalise those who already have low nutrient loss relative to similar land; 
adjustment costs; and compensation for stranded assets. 
Long-term equity suggests that land with similar long-term development 
potential (and hence potential nutrient loss) should be treated equally. This reflects 
the similar loss in their land value in the long term.  This leads towards allocation on 
the basis of potential nutrient loss: hectares interacted with potential productivity of 
those hectares. Allocating on the basis of hectares alone (sometimes called averaging) 
will not correlate well with the loss of land value, as low productivity land that would 
suffer small losses would receive the same allocation as high productivity, high 
nutrient loss, high value land. 
It has been suggested that land use capability be used as a measure of 
potential productivity.  Two difficulties arise with this: first, land use capability data is 
not of great quality at fine resolution; second, land use capability is  an ordinal 
mapping and would need to be translated into potential levels of nutrients in an 
acceptable way. A simple alternative would be to use carrying capacity (potential 
stocking rate) maps and apply fixed emission rates to each stock unit. This approach 
still has data quality issues at fine resolution however.  Horizons Regional Council 
have proposed a similar approach and have developed it more thoroughly (Carran et 
al (2007)). 14 
For properties that will be modelled with OVERSEER for monitoring 
and reporting, a better alternative is available. The actual property can be modelled in 
OVERSEER using best management practices to produce a level of potential 
nutrient loss. The extra cost of doing this would be negligible, other than the 
definition of best management, as the model will be calibrated for the property in any 
case. 
Allocation on the basis of any fixed land characteristics will tend to benefit 
the less developed land and will provide some capital for development.  It will not 
however provide capital to those who need to mitigate – they will face the greatest 
initial shortfall.  
Two issues argue for an alternative approach – at least initially.  First, we 
want to smooth adjustment costs, minimise economic disruption and protect against 
initial market dysfunction during a learning period. Not supporting current emitters 
can increase adjustment costs, the costs arising from rapid changes in economic 
activity. Adjustments may particularly affect poor people with little access to capital 
and vulnerable employment. 
Any allocation other than on the basis of current emissions can cause 
short term economic disruption if the allowance market does not work. If 
landowners find that they own significantly fewer allowances than their current 
emissions (while others have an excess) and they are unable to purchase allowances, 
they may have to make rapid and costly changes.  Alternatively they may claim (with 
some justification) that they are unable to comply, thereby weakening the overall 
regime.   
Second, we may want to partially compensate those who have invested 
heavily in improvements to high productivity properties. These investments may now 
be ‘stranded assets’ which have low value as a result of the regulation. For example a 
recent dairy conversion would lose much of its value once allowances were required 
to cover nutrient loss. Allocation on the basis of historical emissions, 
‘grandparenting’, will achieve both of these goals.  
A grandparenting system needs to be based on an early date to avoid 
strategic behaviour. We do not want people to have an incentive to overstate or even 
increase current emissions to increase their allocation. We want to reward people for 
past good behaviour rather than penalising or discouraging them. It would be 15 
possible also to alter the grandparenting rule slightly to disallow nutrient loss above a 
maximum benchmark set per landuse type. The rule cannot, however, be too 
historical or properties with non-strategic recent growth in nutrient loss would be 
penalised.  
Any grandparenting system, and particularly one that uses a past date, has 
issues with data availability. In the Lake Rotorua catchment, data are already being 
collected for many properties through the Rule 11 benchmarking process.  Accurate 
application of OVERSEER requires several years of historical data but the high costs 
of being this accurate may not be justified. One advantage of using a grandparenting 
approach is  that  initial  allocations  could be based on OVERSEER estimates 
calibrated in the same way for all farms. Any errors would affect both the initial 
allocation and early years of compliance monitoring – the change in monitored losses 
is what matters for the environmental goal rather than the absolute level of nutrient 
loss.  
If the main motivation for grandparenting is to protect against allowance 
market failure rather than to compensate for loss in land and capital value, this could 
be dealt with by direct intervention in the market to ensure a readily available supply 
of allowances, possibly at a fixed price.  This transfers some risk to government but 
could provide reassurance to those who will need allowances.   
One final argument sometimes raised in the context of allocation is the 
potential use of allocation of allowances as a way to provide capital for mitigation. 
This would be aimed at a failure in capital markets, which means that those who 
should mitigate do not have access to capital. It is difficult to identify these people 
and this is a very crude and socially expensive way to address this issue.   
Government (at all levels) has two roles in the catchment.  First, they are a 
landowner and emitter.  Second, they have a responsibility to buy-back some 
allowances as part of the cost sharing approach.  These two roles could be 
completely separated, with government land allocated allowances on the same basis 
as any other land. Government efforts to directly mitigate nutrient loss or alter 
nutrient loads through approaches such as sediment capping could either be used to 
meet their buy-back requirement or could earn them allowances. These allowances 
could be used to cover nutrient loss within the cap, or retired to create a lower 16 
nutrient cap. The costs of each mitigation or offset activity should be compared with 
the allowance price to determine whether it is efficient. 
5  Allowance allocation in other tradable emission systems 
Here we briefly discuss approaches to initial allocation in four New 
Zealand environmental markets (actual and proposed) and common international 
practice. 
 Allowance allocation has been an extremely contested process in the Lake 
Taupo nutrient trading system. The system’s basic approach is grandparenting to the 
landowners at ‘recent historical’ nutrient loss levels – landowners’ highest reported 
nutrient loss for the years 2001-2005 – while government (local and central) pays for 
initial cuts (Environment Waikato (2007)). No mechanism for further cuts has been 
agreed. There has been serious argument about averaging (constant allocation per ha) 
as an alternative and about the perceived inequity of low allocations to relatively 
underutilised land, which has negatively affected foresters and Maori.  
In contrast, Horizon Regional Council in the Manawatu has proposed 
limits on kg of N loss per ha per year on the basis of “underlying natural biophysical 
resources’, effectively a measure of land use capability (Carran et al (2007)) In a 
report to the Council, Carran et al (2007) explain that this approach is independent 
of current and potential future land uses, and also provides landowners with greater 
certainty than alternative approaches. (Note that Horizon Regional Council is 
exploring regulations to address nutrient loss and is not currently considering a 
trading approach.)  
In the New Zealand fisheries Quota Management System (Lock and Leslie 
(2007)), allowances were mostly allocated by grandparenting to vessel owners.  
Initially, the government purchased quota to tighten targets; later they imposed 
proportional cuts on all quota owners. The government bought back a large quantity 
of quota to settle Treaty claims related to fisheries. Some quota for new stocks 
entering the system were auctioned/tendered but some are still grandparented to 
existing vessel owners on the basis of catch history. Twenty percent of all quota for 
new species in the system are allocated to Maori and are shared among iwi according 
to rules that have only recently been agreed. All quota are fully allocated when the 
stock enters the system. To smooth market operation, fishers are able to pay a 
‘deemed value’ to cover extra harvest if they are unable to purchase quota. 17 
Allocation in the New Zealand Emissions Trading System is not yet 
finalised.  Each sector (excluding liquid fuels because it is considered able to pass on 
costs) will receive some free allocation based on 2005 emissions but this will be 
phased out over time. Any additional units must be purchased either domestically or 
internationally. Methods to allocate within sectors are still being developed. 
Allocation in the industrial process and stationary energy sectors mostly aims to 
avoid ‘leakage’, the movement of production of trade-exposed products to 
unregulated countries. Leakage is less relevant for nutrient trading to the extent that 
water quality is a localised issue and is regulated under the Resource Management Act 
throughout New Zealand. In forestry, post 1989 forest owners have been given all 
rights to units generated in new and existing forests. Some units will be freely 
allocated for pre-1990  forests which face  potential liabilities. The key issues are 
around equity, particularly for land that was part of Treaty settlements, and 
opportunities to develop underutilised land
6
6  What share of each vintage should be allocated at what 
time? 
.  The allocation rules for agriculture are 
currently undefined but the key issues are avoiding leakage, providing compensation 
for losses in land value, providing opportunities to develop underutilised land, and 
avoiding adjustment costs.  
Few overseas trading systems regulate agriculture. To the extent that 
agriculture is included in water quality trading programmes it is primarily through 
offset systems where the initial allocation is implicitly business as usual emissions 
(World Resources Institute (2009)). In other trading systems, initial allocation is 
almost invariably on the basis of historical emissions although this is sometimes 
altered to reflect other political or equity issues (see for example the discussion of 
allocation in the US acid raid program in Joskow and Schmalensee (1998)). This 
tendency to use grandparenting reflects political reality in most situations rather than 
any basis in equity or efficiency principles.  
The prototype nutrient trading system developed at Motu for Lake 
Rotorua requires allowances to be surrendered at the time nutrients are put on the 
ground.  The specific allowances required depend on when the nutrients from that 
                                                            
6 Some issues also arise because of the poor design of the related Kyoto rules, which define New 
Zealand’s obligation.  The rules are not aligned with the environmental impact of deforestation or pre-
1990 forest.  18 
property will enter the lake water. Depending on the property and its characteristics, 
the time from when a nutrient is applied to the land until it reaches the lake through 
the groundwater system can be between zero and 200 years. Allowances will each 
have a declared ‘vintage’  corresponding to the date the nutrients reach the lake, 
grouped into date-ranges yet to be determined (Kerr et al (2007)).  
As a consequence of this design, the nutrient trading system needs to 
define environmental goals and trading caps for lake quality up to 200 years in 
advance.  This does not mean that all allowances for the next 200 years should be 
allocated immediately, but some of each vintage needs to be allocated, because some 
of each will be used immediately.   
In a world where governments can make binding long-term commitments, 
with perfect markets and rational fully-informed actors, it would be most efficient to 
allocate all future allowances now so that those who most want them in their 
investment portfolio can hold them. Investors could more easily hedge allowance 
price risk, futures markets would be more likely to develop, and the vested property 
rights would provide a strong political voice in favour of protecting the system in 
order to maintain the value of allowances.  
In the real world, there are some reasons to issue allowances gradually.  
The system should issues more allowances than are immediately required, but fewer 
than all.  There are three basic reasons for this:  market efficiency, protection of 
people who may be less well informed, and avoiding regulatory collapse as a result of 
governments’ inability to make binding commitments. Gradual issuing does not 
mean that the legal rights to future allowances are not well defined, but it does 
reduce the ability to use or trade them in advance.   
A burst of trading each time new allowances are allocated will promote 
liquidity in the market by providing regular price signals. Regular issuing of 
allowances also provides some protection against some players accumulating a large 
share of any vintage and exercising market power. If some allowances are issued 
through an auction, small players would have greater access to allowances. In our 
proposed system, allowances would be available for auction only if they had been 
bought back from participants by government because more than the total cap is 
initially allocated freely to participants.  19 
Gradual issuing has one inefficient effect: it affects who bears the risk of 
costs from proportional cuts in future vintages (see section 7.1).  Whoever holds, or 
has legal right to allowances, will bear the costs of changes in the environmental goal. 
A landowner who holds future allowances they do not expect to need may wish to 
sell to avoid uncertain prices. This risk is not easily transferred away if the landowner 
has rights to future allowances but they are not yet legally issued.   
Gradually issuing allowances in each vintage provides some protection for 
people who may sell their allowances early and then have regrets.  This may be 
particularly relevant for small Maori Trusts but would also affect other 
unsophisticated landowners. Many owners and trustees may not understand the value 
of what has been granted to them. They may prematurely sell these units at lower 
than their long run value and therefore diminish development options for future 
generations.  If allowances are gradually issued, the extent of these misjudgements 
will be limited and they will have the chance to make different decisions as they learn 
how the system operates. 
Another option to reduce this risk for some Maori land in particular is to 
put Maori landowners’ allowances into a central pool run by a Trust (for example Te 
Arawa Lakes Trust).  This Trust could distribute allowances to the well-organised 
trusts like Ngati Whakaue but the balance of units would remain with the Trust. The 
Trust would allocate allowances each year to small units who want to develop and 
would sell off each year’s surplus. The revenue could be used both to run this pool 
and perhaps to sponsor development or mitigation options. A similar approach has 
been used for managing fisheries quota (Lock and Leslie (2007)).  
If all allowances for all future years were immediately issued and 
landowners whose nutrients reach the lake with a lag decided not to control nutrients 
(there will be no short term shortage of the vintage of allowances they need), at some 
point landowners with shorter lags would be unable to comply with the regulation 
without stopping all activity immediately.  All allowances of the vintage they need will 
have been used.  At this point it is not credible to believe that the government would 
let all these landowners stop farming.  
Although the government would like to commit in advance to allow farms 
to be forced to stop producing, they have time inconsistent preferences and when 
this situation arises they will inevitably give in (as a cost benefit analysis done at that 20 
time would suggest was optimal). If landowners recognise this, they will have an 
incentive to use allowances too fast assuming the system will collapse. They will not 
plan carefully for the future. Their belief in the collapse of the system will be self 
fullfilling.   
One way to avoid this, particularly while the system is being established, is 
to issue only enough of each vintage to cover business as usual needs in the next 
year.  As the system becomes viewed as more robust and develops vested interests in 
favour of its continuance, the number of advance allowances that can be issued could 
be increased.    
7  How costs can be shared as the system evolves 
The nutrient trading system will need to evolve over time as new scientific 
information emerges and as social preferences change. The critical question here is 
how the distributional implications of these changes should be handled:should the 
same principles be applied to changes in the cap and the impacts of changes in 
scientific knowledge as were used to define initial allocation?   
7.1  Changes to the cap 
Two arguments suggest that the same cost bearing principles should also 
apply to costs (or benefits) from changing the environmental target.  The first is that 
the same actors are gaining similar benefits and sharing similar costs. The second is 
that it is good to avoid renegotiation of distributional issues unless there is a 
compelling reason.  Renegotiation is costly and induces strategic behaviour, which is 
costly to society. As an example, anticipating renegotiation could lead farmers to 
under-invest in mitigation in order to protect their bargaining position. They can 
continue to claim that they have high mitigation costs. Renegotiation also exacerbates 
investment uncertainty. 
On the other hand, social preferences for cost bearing could change over 
time. Understanding the true scale of costs and benefits can also alter perceptions of 
how costs could be shared. Many people are uncomfortable about creating firm 
property rights to something about which most people have very little understanding.  
They fear that the powerful will unfairly benefit in the first negotiations over 
allocation because they better understand the value of the allowances and have the 
resources to fight for an allocation rule that is favourable to them. Thus renegotiation 21 
of cost sharing rules should not (and in fact cannot under New Zealand law) be ruled 
out.   
To strike a balance, we propose that the same principles used for initial 
allocation and buy back are applied to future changes in the cap as the default option. 
An active change in policy, possibly requiring a change in the District Plan, is needed 
to change this.  Specifically we propose that if central government bears 50% of the 
cost of the initial buy back, they should similarly bear 50% of future cuts. Reductions 
shared among allowance holders would be on the basis of proportional reductions in 
the nutrient loss that can be matched by each outstanding allowance of the vintage 
affected. The question of allocation among emitters does not need to be revisited as 
the reduction is on the basis of who owns the allowances, not who was initially 
allocated them. The price of allowances should reflect this risk. 
Any changes in the caps should be publicised well in advance to minimise 
uncertainty.  They could be incorporated in regular reviews (perhaps each 5 years). 
Changes in the caps could be applied with a lag so they do not affect immediate 
allowance needs.   
7.2  Scientific developments  
The other likely cause of change in the system, new scientific information 
on the nutrient impacts of different activities, may require a different set of 
principles. The driver of change in this situation is new science. This is largely outside 
of the control of emitters. They cannot easily influence it and cannot be expected to 
anticipate it. This suggests application of the principle of non-retrospective 
regulation.  Emitters should not be penalised or rewarded for actions they have 
already taken. This suggests that landowners affected by changes to the model that 
assigns nutrient loss to particular land uses and management should be fully 
compensated for changes that harm them, and required to provide allowances to 
match the effects of changes that are in their favour. If the change in the monitoring 
model suggests that the catchment as a whole will no longer meet the environmental 
goal (or will overachieve), the standard mechanism discussed above for adjusting the 
total cap should be applied.   
Full compensation  for changes in monitoring does lead to slight 
overcompensation. This is because mitigation opportunities have changed for actions 
where the model has changed. As long as landowners cannot affect the process and 22 
so respond perversely to the promise of full compensation, this overcompensation 
has no efficiency impacts and the equity impacts are not likely to be too large. 
Some more active participants in the market will however anticipate and 
cause change in the monitoring model. They will identify mitigation options and 
push for them to be included and they will search for and promote scientific research 
that reduces their obligations. The full compensation rule will reduce pressure to 
change rules in favour of existing land use and management practices. It will however 
encourage strategic delays in the adoption of mitigation actions where the rewards 
from mitigation are anticipated to rise – actors will thus avoid the need to give up 
allowances matching the improvement in their position. For example, if a landowner 
anticipates that wetland enhancement will be added to the monitoring model, they 
will wait to enhance their wetland.  If they enhance it now, when the model changes 
it will be regarded as an existing practice and they will have to give up allowances 
matching the improvement in their compliance position.  In contrast, if they delay 
enhancing it until after the model changes, they will receive the full benefit.  
Similarly, anticipated rises in modelled nutrient loss will encourage 
strategic choices of inefficient land use and practices.  Landowners in this situation 
will anticipate compensation for an  increased allowance obligation if they wait.  
When the rules change they can benefit again by changing their behaviour. For 
example if a landowner anticipates that the emission coefficient for plantation 
forestry will rise, even if they would like to convert to native forest, they will delay 
the conversion until after they receive the compensation. Both sets of strategic 
behaviour are environmentally damaging and create inequitable gains to those who 
have inside information or ability to influence the system. One way to reduce this 
problem is to announce the probability of a change in rule in advance.  
Compensation (or additional allowance requirements) would only apply to land use 
and practice at that point in time . Uncertainty about mitigation rewards in the period 
between this announcement and the announcement of the new rule must be offset 
against the reduction in perverse behaviour.       
8  Conclusion – tentative recommendations 
To ease the economic impact of the nutrient trading system’s 
introduction, we propose that allowances are initially allocated to nutrient sources in 
proportion to their current nutrient loss. Not all nutrient sources will receive the 23 
same vintage allowances. The vintage allowances that are received by the nutrient 
source will depend on their vintage zone: a property with a 50-year groundwater lag 
won’t receive any allowances from the first 50 vintages, as the property will never be 
required to cover nutrient inputs to the lake in these years.  
Maintaining current nutrient losses will not achieve water quality goals. 
Therefore it needs to be decided who will pay for the required nutrient loss 
reductions. If only the number of allowances equal to the goal were allocated, the 
environmental target would be achieved but most of the cost of nutrient reductions 
would be borne by the nutrient sources. In contrast, if sufficient allowances were 
allocated to cover current nutrient loss, and the government bought back and retired 
sufficient allowances to meet the goal, tax or ratepayers would bear all of the cost 
and nutrient sources would actually profit from the system
7
For allowances beyond the vintages that each landowner needs in the first 
few years of the system, the allocation mechanism will transition to one based on 
potential nutrient loss, providing a more equitable system. This prevents landowners 
. Somewhere between 
these two extremes is likely to be ideal, with nutrient sources and central and local 
government each bearing some of the cost of achieving reductions. Thus, the 
nutrient sources are allocated fewer allowances than they need to cover current 
nutrient loss and central and local government must buy allowances from the market 
to achieve the remainder of the reduction to achieve the ‘goal’ level of inputs.  
The share of the reduction that is paid by each of the parties should be 
consistent across vintages and explicitly defined. For example, 
X% is through District Council buy-back 
Y% is through Regional Council buy-back 
Z% is through Central Government buy-back 
The remainder of the reduction is a proportional cut in unused allowance holdings of 
the appropriate vintage. This ensures that all parties bear some of the cost but that 
the reductions are not too great a burden on any party.  
                                                            
7  The reductions that are funded by central or local government should be used to purchase 
allowances directly off allowance holders. This could be done via a tender process where allowance 
holders submit tenders stating how many allowances of each vintage they are willing to sell and for 
what price. Allowances are purchased from the lowest price bids until the required allowances have all 
been purchased. A single buy back process could be used and the funding of the allowances split 
between the three funders.  24 
becoming trapped in their current land use if they do not have sufficient capital to 
purchase allowances and avoids rewarding high nutrient loss properties indefinitely. 
To enable this to happen, a measure of potential nutrient loss needs to be 
determined. Some potential options are land use capability (based on slope, soil type 
etc) and potential stocking rates applied through the OVERSEER model with 
‘standard’ management practices.  
Both the ‘grandparenting’ and ‘potential nutrient loss’ allocation rules 
must be as simple as possible and based on readily available data that cannot be 
challenged to make it as fair as possible (and perceived as such). The same calibration 
of OVERSEER (with add-ons) used to monitor the system should be used for free 
allocation, to align allocation and obligations to surrender and to reduce participants’ 
risk. This limits the incentives for participants to bias model calibration as increasing 
your nutrient loss to gain more allowances in the allocation process will also mean 
that you are required to surrender more allowances each year.  
The allocation of allowances should be carried out in stages rather than 
individuals receiving all future allowances at once. For example, individuals could 
receive vintage allowances relevant to their first five years in the system. This would 
protect uniformed allowance holders from selling all of their allowances before they 
fully understood the system. It would also protect the credibility of the system. This 
would prevent all of the allowances being used in the first few years of the system, 
which would severely restrict future nutrient loss from the catchment and lead to 
increased pressure to increase the trading caps and/or abandon the system. Regular 
injections of allowances could also lead to periods of increased trading as individuals 
adjust their allowance holdings. This would provide regular price signals for the 
market. 
Cost sharing when changing targets should be based on the same 
principles as reducing nutrient loss when initially allocating allowances. For example, 
if allowance holders fund 30% of the initial reduction in allowances that were 
allocated, they should also fund 30% of any future changes in the cap. Similarly, if 
the trading cap were increased, allowance holders would receive 30% of the newly 
created allowances.  This could be deeply embedded in the system by defining each 
allowance as a share of the target for that vintage rather than an absolute level of 
tonnes of nutrients.   25 
Fixing these cost-sharing rules in advance ensures that future decisions are 
only about the appropriate levels of the caps and not about who is paying for them. 
This should focus discussion on the optimal social decision rather than being biased 
by special interests. 
When changes are made to the model used to monitor nutrient loss, 
landowners should not have to enter the market to purchase extra allowances to 
continue in their current land use/activities. Regulation should not impose 
retrospective penalties (or rewards) on specific properties for changes that are out of 
their control and which they cannot anticipate. Imposing costs on a small group of 
properties would create resistance to science-based improvements to the system.  
We propose that landowners’ allocation of allowances be adjusted to 
account for the increase or decrease in allowances now needed to cover their nutrient 
loss. This involves giving allowances to or taking allowances from landowners to 
ensure that they are no better or worse off.  If the new model alters the aggregate 
level of nutrient loss, the adjustments to allowance levels to restore the 
environmental goal should use the same mechanism as outlined above to address 
changes in the trading caps.  
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